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  1. TWITTER FILES: Statement to Congress THE CENSORSHIP-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
1.  TWITTER FILES:
 Statement to Congress
THE CENSORSHIP-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
1.  TWITTER FILES:
 Statement to Congress
THE CENSORSHIP-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
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  1. “MONITOR ALL TWEETS COMING FROM TRUMP’S PERSONAL ACCOUNT/BIDEN’S PERSONAL ACCOUNT”

When #TwitterFiles reporters were given access to Twitter internal documents last year, we first focused on the company, which at times acted like a power above government.

2.  “MONITOR ALL TWEETS COMING FROM TRUMP’S PERSONAL ACCOUNT/BIDEN’S PERSONAL ACCOUNT”

When #Twitte
2.  “MONITOR ALL TWEETS COMING FROM TRUMP’S PERSONAL ACCOUNT/BIDEN’S PERSONAL ACCOUNT”

When #Twitte
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  1. But Twitter was more like a partner to government.

With other tech firms it held a regular “industry meeting” with FBI and DHS, and developed a formal system for receiving thousands of content reports from every corner of government: HHS, Treasury, NSA, even local police:

3.  But Twitter was more like a partner to government. 

With other tech firms it held a regular “in
3.  But Twitter was more like a partner to government. 

With other tech firms it held a regular “in
3.  But Twitter was more like a partner to government. 

With other tech firms it held a regular “in
3.  But Twitter was more like a partner to government. 

With other tech firms it held a regular “in
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  1. Emails from the FBI, DHS and other agencies often came with spreadsheets of hundreds or thousands of account names for review. Often, these would be deleted soon after.
4.  Emails from the FBI, DHS and other agencies often came with spreadsheets of hundreds or thousand
4.  Emails from the FBI, DHS and other agencies often came with spreadsheets of hundreds or thousand
4.  Emails from the FBI, DHS and other agencies often came with spreadsheets of hundreds or thousand
4.  Emails from the FBI, DHS and other agencies often came with spreadsheets of hundreds or thousand
4.  Emails from the FBI, DHS and other agencies often came with spreadsheets of hundreds or thousand
4.  Emails from the FBI, DHS and other agencies often came with spreadsheets of hundreds or thousand
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  1. Many were obvious “misinformation,” like accounts urging people to vote the day after an election.

But other official "disinfo" reports had shakier reasoning. The highlighted Twitter analysis here disagrees with the FBI about accounts deemed a “proxy of Russian actors":

5.  Many were obvious “misinformation,” like accounts urging people to vote the day after an electio
5.  Many were obvious “misinformation,” like accounts urging people to vote the day after an electio
5.  Many were obvious “misinformation,” like accounts urging people to vote the day after an electio
5.  Many were obvious “misinformation,” like accounts urging people to vote the day after an electio
5.  Many were obvious “misinformation,” like accounts urging people to vote the day after an electio
5.  Many were obvious “misinformation,” like accounts urging people to vote the day after an electio
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  1. Then we saw "disinfo" lists where evidence was even less clear. This list of 378 “Iranian State Linked Accounts” includes an Iraq vet once arrested for blogging about the war, a former Chicago Sun-Times reporter and Truthout, a site that publishes Noam Chomsky.
6.  Then we saw "disinfo" lists where evidence was even less clear. This list of 378 “Iranian State
6.  Then we saw "disinfo" lists where evidence was even less clear. This list of 378 “Iranian State
6.  Then we saw "disinfo" lists where evidence was even less clear. This list of 378 “Iranian State
6.  Then we saw "disinfo" lists where evidence was even less clear. This list of 378 “Iranian State
6.  Then we saw "disinfo" lists where evidence was even less clear. This list of 378 “Iranian State
6.  Then we saw "disinfo" lists where evidence was even less clear. This list of 378 “Iranian State
6.  Then we saw "disinfo" lists where evidence was even less clear. This list of 378 “Iranian State
6.  Then we saw "disinfo" lists where evidence was even less clear. This list of 378 “Iranian State
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  1. In some cases, state reports didn’t even assert misinformation. Here, a list of YouTube videos is flagged for “anti-Ukraine narratives”:
7.  In some cases, state reports didn’t even assert misinformation. Here, a list of YouTube videos i
7.  In some cases, state reports didn’t even assert misinformation. Here, a list of YouTube videos i
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  1. But the bulk of censorship requests didn’t come from government directly.
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  1. Asked if Twitter’s marketing department could say the company detects “misinfo” with help of “outside experts,” a Twitter executive replied:
9.  Asked if Twitter’s marketing department could say the company detects “misinfo” with help of “ou
9.  Asked if Twitter’s marketing department could say the company detects “misinfo” with help of “ou
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  1. We came to think of this grouping – state agencies like DHS, FBI, or the Global Engagement Center (GEC), along with “NGOs that aren’t academic” and an unexpectedly aggressive partner, commercial news media – as the Censorship-Industrial Complex.
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  1. Who’s in the Censorship-Industrial Complex? Twitter in 2020 helpfully compiled a list for a working group set up in 2020.

The National Endowment for Democracy, the Atlantic Council’s DFRLab, and Hamilton 68’s creator, the Alliance for Securing Democracy, are key:

11.  Who’s in the Censorship-Industrial Complex? Twitter in 2020 helpfully compiled a list for a wor
11.  Who’s in the Censorship-Industrial Complex? Twitter in 2020 helpfully compiled a list for a wor
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  1. Twitter execs weren’t sure about Clemson’s Media Forensics Lab (“too chummy with HPSCI”), and weren’t keen on the Rand Corporation (“too close to USDOD”), but others were deemed just right.
12.  Twitter execs weren’t sure about Clemson’s Media Forensics Lab (“too chummy with HPSCI”), and w
12.  Twitter execs weren’t sure about Clemson’s Media Forensics Lab (“too chummy with HPSCI”), and w
12.  Twitter execs weren’t sure about Clemson’s Media Forensics Lab (“too chummy with HPSCI”), and w
12.  Twitter execs weren’t sure about Clemson’s Media Forensics Lab (“too chummy with HPSCI”), and w
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  1. NGOs ideally serve as a check on corporations and the government. Not long ago, most of these institutions viewed themselves that way. Now, intel officials, “researchers,” and executives at firms like Twitter are effectively one team - or Signal group, as it were:
13.  NGOs ideally serve as a check on corporations and the government. Not long ago, most of these i
13.  NGOs ideally serve as a check on corporations and the government. Not long ago, most of these i
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  1. The Woodstock of the Censorship-Industrial Complex came when the Aspen Institute - which receives millions a year from both the State Department and USAID - held a star-studded confab in Aspen in August 2021 to release its final report on “Information Disorder.”
14.  The Woodstock of the Censorship-Industrial Complex came when the Aspen Institute - which receiv
14.  The Woodstock of the Censorship-Industrial Complex came when the Aspen Institute - which receiv
14.  The Woodstock of the Censorship-Industrial Complex came when the Aspen Institute - which receiv
14.  The Woodstock of the Censorship-Industrial Complex came when the Aspen Institute - which receiv
14.  The Woodstock of the Censorship-Industrial Complex came when the Aspen Institute - which receiv
14.  The Woodstock of the Censorship-Industrial Complex came when the Aspen Institute - which receiv
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  1. The report was co-authored by Katie Couric and Chris Krebs, the founder of the DHS’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). Yoel Roth of Twitter and Nathaniel Gleicher of Facebook were technical advisors. Prince Harry joined Couric as a Commissioner.
15.  The report was co-authored by Katie Couric and Chris Krebs, the founder of the DHS’s Cybersecur
15.  The report was co-authored by Katie Couric and Chris Krebs, the founder of the DHS’s Cybersecur
15.  The report was co-authored by Katie Couric and Chris Krebs, the founder of the DHS’s Cybersecur
15.  The report was co-authored by Katie Couric and Chris Krebs, the founder of the DHS’s Cybersecur
15.  The report was co-authored by Katie Couric and Chris Krebs, the founder of the DHS’s Cybersecur
15.  The report was co-authored by Katie Couric and Chris Krebs, the founder of the DHS’s Cybersecur
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  1. Their taxpayer-backed conclusions: the state should have total access to data to make searching speech easier, speech offenders should be put in a “holding area," and government should probably restrict disinformation, “even if it means losing some freedom.”
16.  Their taxpayer-backed conclusions: the state should have total access to data to make searching
16.  Their taxpayer-backed conclusions: the state should have total access to data to make searching
16.  Their taxpayer-backed conclusions: the state should have total access to data to make searching
16.  Their taxpayer-backed conclusions: the state should have total access to data to make searching
16.  Their taxpayer-backed conclusions: the state should have total access to data to make searching
16.  Their taxpayer-backed conclusions: the state should have total access to data to make searching
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  1. Note Aspen recommended the power to mandate data disclosure be given to the FTC, which this committee just caught in a clear abuse of office, demanding information from Twitter about communications with (and identities of) #TwitterFiles reporters. judiciary.house.gov/sites/evo-subs…
17.  Note Aspen recommended the power to mandate data disclosure be given to the FTC, which this com
17.  Note Aspen recommended the power to mandate data disclosure be given to the FTC, which this com
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  1. Naturally Twitter’s main concern regarding the Aspen report was making sure Facebook got hit harder by any resulting regulatory changes:
18. Naturally Twitter’s main concern regarding the Aspen report was making sure Facebook got hit har
18. Naturally Twitter’s main concern regarding the Aspen report was making sure Facebook got hit har
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  1. The same agencies (FBI, DHS/CISA, GEC) invite the same “experts” (Thomas Rid, Alex Stamos), funded by the same foundations (Newmark, Omidyar, Knight) trailed by the same reporters (Margaret Sullivan, Molly McKew, Brandy Zadrozny) seemingly to every conference, every panel.
19.  The same agencies (FBI, DHS/CISA, GEC) invite the same “experts” (Thomas Rid, Alex Stamos), fun
19.  The same agencies (FBI, DHS/CISA, GEC) invite the same “experts” (Thomas Rid, Alex Stamos), fun
19.  The same agencies (FBI, DHS/CISA, GEC) invite the same “experts” (Thomas Rid, Alex Stamos), fun
19.  The same agencies (FBI, DHS/CISA, GEC) invite the same “experts” (Thomas Rid, Alex Stamos), fun
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  1. The #TwitterFiles show the principals of this incestuous self-appointed truth squad moving from law enforcement/intelligence to the private sector and back, claiming a special right to do what they say is bad practice for everyone else: be fact-checked only by themselves.
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21.While Twitter sometimes pushed back on technical analyses from NGOs about who is and isn't a “bot,” on subject matter questions like vaccines or elections they instantly defer to sites like Politifact, funded by the same names that fund the NGOs: Koch, Newmark, Knight.

21.While Twitter sometimes pushed back on technical analyses from NGOs about who is and isn't a “bot
21.While Twitter sometimes pushed back on technical analyses from NGOs about who is and isn't a “bot
21.While Twitter sometimes pushed back on technical analyses from NGOs about who is and isn't a “bot
21.While Twitter sometimes pushed back on technical analyses from NGOs about who is and isn't a “bot
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  1. #TwitterFiles repeatedly show media acting as proxy for NGOs, with Twitter bracing for bad headlines if they don't nix accounts. Here, the Financial Times gives Twitter until end of day to provide a “steer” on whether RFK, Jr. and other vax offenders will be zapped.
22.  #TwitterFiles repeatedly show media acting as proxy for NGOs, with Twitter bracing for bad head
22.  #TwitterFiles repeatedly show media acting as proxy for NGOs, with Twitter bracing for bad head
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  1. Well, you say, so what? Why shouldn’t civil society organizations and reporters work together to boycott “misinformation”? Isn’t that not just an exercise of free speech, but a particularly enlightened form of it?
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  1. The difference is, these campaigns are taxpayer-funded. Though the state is supposed to stay out domestic propaganda, the Aspen Institute, Graphika, the Atlantic Council’s DFRLab, New America, and other “anti-disinformation” labs are receiving huge public awards.
24.  The difference is, these campaigns are taxpayer-funded. Though the state is supposed to stay ou
24.  The difference is, these campaigns are taxpayer-funded. Though the state is supposed to stay ou
24.  The difference is, these campaigns are taxpayer-funded. Though the state is supposed to stay ou
24.  The difference is, these campaigns are taxpayer-funded. Though the state is supposed to stay ou
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  1. Some NGOs, like the GEC-funded Global Disinformation Index or the DOD-funded Newsguard, not only seek content moderation but apply subjective “risk” or “reliability” scores to media outlets, which can result in reduction in revenue. Do we want government in this role?
25.  Some NGOs, like the GEC-funded Global Disinformation Index or the DOD-funded Newsguard, not onl
25.  Some NGOs, like the GEC-funded Global Disinformation Index or the DOD-funded Newsguard, not onl
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  1. Perhaps the ultimate example of the absolute fusion of state, corporate, and civil society organizations is the Stanford Internet Observatory (SIO), whose “Election Integrity Partnership” is among the most voluminous “flaggers” in the #TwitterFiles:
26.  Perhaps the ultimate example of the absolute fusion of state, corporate, and civil society orga
26.  Perhaps the ultimate example of the absolute fusion of state, corporate, and civil society orga
26.  Perhaps the ultimate example of the absolute fusion of state, corporate, and civil society orga
26.  Perhaps the ultimate example of the absolute fusion of state, corporate, and civil society orga
26.  Perhaps the ultimate example of the absolute fusion of state, corporate, and civil society orga
26.  Perhaps the ultimate example of the absolute fusion of state, corporate, and civil society orga
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  1. After public uproar “paused” the Orwellian “Disinformation Governance Board” of the DHS in early 2020, Stanford created the EIP to “fill the gaps” legally, as director Alex Stamos explains here (h/t Foundation for Freedom Online). youtube.com/watch?v=QbF2UX…
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  1. EIP research manager Renee DiResta boasted that while filling “gaps," the EIP succeeded in getting “tech partners” Google, TikTok, Facebook and Twitter to take action on “35% of the URLS flagged” under “remove, reduce, or inform” policies. youtube.com/watch?v=RtcK59…
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  1. According to the EIP’s own data, it succeeded in getting nearly 22 million tweets labeled in the runup to the 2020 vote.
29.  According to the EIP’s own data, it succeeded in getting nearly 22 million tweets labeled in th
29.  According to the EIP’s own data, it succeeded in getting nearly 22 million tweets labeled in th
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  1. It’s crucial to reiterate: EIP was partnered with state entities like CISA and GEC while seeking elimination of millions of tweets. In the #TwitterFiles, Twitter execs did not distinguish between organizations, using phrases like “According to CIS[A], escalated via EIP.”
30.  It’s crucial to reiterate: EIP was partnered with state entities like CISA and GEC while seekin
30.  It’s crucial to reiterate: EIP was partnered with state entities like CISA and GEC while seekin
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  1. After the 2020 election, when EIP was renamed the Virality Project, the Stanford lab was on-boarded to Twitter’s JIRA ticketing system, absorbing this government proxy into Twitter infrastructure – with a capability of taking in an incredible 50 million tweets a day.
31.  After the 2020 election, when EIP was renamed the Virality Project, the Stanford lab was on-boa
31.  After the 2020 election, when EIP was renamed the Virality Project, the Stanford lab was on-boa
31.  After the 2020 election, when EIP was renamed the Virality Project, the Stanford lab was on-boa
31.  After the 2020 election, when EIP was renamed the Virality Project, the Stanford lab was on-boa