space as well as "occupation theories". In discussing the latter, HH refers to Josh Parsons' discussion of relations and location. He also identifies and discusses six puzzles connected with occupation theories: 2/

—1. The problem of simplicity. How can a simple entity be present in multiple locations? (NB: Easy to answer if you think in terms of #SanskritPhilosophy, think of ātman and ākāśa as being simple and vibhu). —2. The problem of multilocation. How can sth occupy 3/

(i.e., be fully present) in two numerically distinct regions? (Again, think of ākāśa for a solution: God would just need to be co-extensive with ākāśa, perhaps? —3. The problem of containment. Would not God be limited by Their occupying a specific region? 4/

As for 2, Hudson suggests that this can be solved through the concept of entension (≠extension), as elaborated by Parsons. 'x entends' is defined as follows: "x is an object that is wholly & entirely located at a non-point-sized region r & for each proper subregion of r, r*, 5/

x is wholly located at r*". (NB: I am yet to read Parsons and I don't know how he justify this possibility). As for 3., Hudson replies that God's freedom can be safeguarded bc They bear "occupation relations accidentally rather than essentially". 6/

—4. The problem of timelessness. How can sth occupy a region and be atemporal? (Again, Hudson suggests that this is not too big a problem, bc it could be an accidental rather essential feature of God). —5. The problem of incorporeality. How can sth occupy a region and fail 7/

to have a body? (Again, Hudson suggests that this might be an accidental and extrinsic characteristic of God, and that also Hartshorne and Swinburne had to compromise even more here, even accepting a form of pantheism) 8/

—6. The problem of co-location. How can two numerically distinct things each occupy the same regions? (Again, think of ākāśa, ātman etc. for examples of entities that can co-extend over the same region without excluding each other) 9/

Two more points: At the end, Hudson discusses the individuation principle and wonders whether "necessarily, for any located objects, x and y, x is located at all and only the same regions as y iff x=y". This leads to problems, Hudson says, for Trinitarian Christians. 10/

Within Sanskrit philosophy, no one I know would agree about it, at least not in the case of vibhu entities.

At the beginning, Hudson discusses Anselm's understanding of omnipresence as amounting to "God's sensing or perceiving at each place and time". He also discusses 11/

Thomas's understanding of omnipresence as "a necessary condition of God's causality". In other words, Anselm needs omnipresence to enable omniscience. Thomas needs it to enable omnipotence. However (here EF speaking) they also have passages speaking of the need for God to 12/

"sustain" the world, which seem to speak of something else. 13/